This is Russia Derangement Syndrome or what we used to call Russophobia.

Russia a) has zero intent to invade the rest of Europe, b) has zero capability to invade the rest of Europe, c) gains absolutely nothing by invading the rest of Europe, d) creates incredible strategic weakness by invading the rest of Europe, and e) alienates not only European markets but would even alienate it's own allies

Russia cannot and will not invade the rest of Europe. Anyone fear mongering to the contrary is selling something.

Russian hasn't done a single thing that Europe didn't find entirely acceptable when it was being done by themselves, the US, or Israel.

Marvel brain logic

Honestly, for Europe the choice is to fight Russian in Ukraine now, or fight them in other European countries later.

I totally agree, don't listen to the tankies here! That's why every European should sign up for Ukraine's foreign legion as soon as possible! Let me know folks if you need any help with that.

After 3½ years of fighting Russia hasn’t even taken all of the Donbas yet, never mind Ukraine. They couldn’t continue on invading Europe even if they wanted to, which they don’t.

This kind of confusion is what happens when you misunderstand why the war started in the first place. Previously.

Your comment contains a lot of oversimplifications:

• The options are not limited to "fight in Ukraine" or "fight elsewhere later." A spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and limited military responses exists along a continuum.
• As currently constituted, European militaries lack sufficient capacity to "fight Russia in Ukraine" in any direct sense without American participation, making the proposed choice somewhat theoretical.
• The statement fails to account for Russian nuclear threats that have successfully constrained Western military responses throughout the conflict. This factor would remain regardless of where confrontation with Russia occurs.

Many experts call for the pursuit of diplomatic pathways out of the stalemate to avoid a protracted war and further escalation. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published numerous analytical pieces (e.g., by analyst Eugene Rumer) emphasizing that without realistic diplomatic negotiations about Europe's future security architecture, the conflict risks turning into a frozen, yet smoldering phase for years to come.

https://www.cfr.org/article/neutrality-alternative-ukraines-membership-nato

An alternative scenario is a strategy that involves not "fighting the Russians in Ukraine" but maximally strengthening Europe's own defensiveness and supporting Ukraine to strengthen its position in potential negotiations. Dr Barbara Kunz and Dan Smith from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), have noted that the EU and NATO's long-term strategy should focus on scaling up their own defense production and capabilities, not just on supplying arms to Ukraine.

However, instead of focusing on the dynamics outlined above, today’s wider European security debate is very much about Russia’s alleged true essence as an imperial or colonial power. There is no doubt that Russia’s actions, which include invading a sovereign country, and its regime’s rhetoric are deeply worrying and unacceptable. But solely focusing on Russian identity for explanations overlooks the dynamic nature of international relations. Russia’s perceptions of the West and its actions are rarely discussed. Nor is how the West’s actions affect strategic stability. While Russia’s intentions are clearly a crucial factor for European security, debating Russia’s nature tends to be highly speculative.

https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2024/nato-new-need-some-old-ideas