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When Israeli missiles pierced the skies over Tehran in the early hours of June 12th, obliterating the Revolutionary Guard’s command center in a precision strike, Iran found itself stripped of illusions. And when it turned for help, it didn’t call Moscow. It reached for two phone lines: Beijing and Islamabad.

Within hours, Iran’s foreign minister was on the phone with China’s minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. Soon after, Pakistan declared its support, and military aircraft were spotted entering Iranian airspace. The symbolism was stark: when the Islamic Republic felt existential threat, it turned to the East.

So — will China back Iran?

The answer is: most probably yes—and in some ways, it’s already happening. Iran’s recent missile strikes have become notably more precise, largely due to China granting it access to the Advanced BeiDou satellite navigation system. If Pakistan is visibly supporting Iran, it’s unlikely to be acting alone. China supplies most of Pakistan’s military hardware, and its logistical and technical backing is essential to any sustained Pakistani operation.

But before looking forward, we must first understand how strained the China–Iran relationship had become.

China’s support for Iran doesn’t stem from alliance, affinity, or ideological kinship. It’s not about brotherhood. Xi Jinping, as China’s leader and a figure of influence in the Global South, may personally see Israel’s actions as crossing fundamental lines of basic human decency—but that’s not the driving force here. China’s position is shaped by strategic consideration: energy security, the energy corridor, and the broader logic of the Belt and Road Initiative. Supporting Iran, for China, is not sentimental. It’s pragmatic—a rational stance toward a country that sits on a key geopolitical fault line of Eurasian infrastructure.

A Marriage of Convenience, Not Conviction

Recently China and Iran's relationship has been estranged. It wasn’t always this frosty. Back in 2021, China and Iran signed a sweeping 25-year strategic cooperation agreement worth about $400 billion — spanning energy, ports, finance, and even military training. It was hailed as Tehran’s pivot to the East, an exit ramp from sanctions and isolation. For a brief moment, it looked like Iran had chosen the China-Russia bloc.

But the ink had barely dried before Tehran’s behavior grew erratic. Projects were shelved, port cooperation at Chabahar stalled, solar equipment was seized by the IRGC, and in a twist that felt like a deliberate snub, Iran leased the same port to India — even as India was cozying up to the U.S. and preparing for confrontation with Pakistan.

Worse, just as India and Pakistan were on the brink of war, Iran signed a full-spectrum strategic agreement with New Delhi. No pretense of neutrality — just opportunism. Wherever the wind blew, Iran tilted. Its foreign policy became a study in hedging: foot in the East, heart in the West, eyes on the next buyer.

Anti-Americanism for Sale

What Iran seemed to have discovered was that, in a world divided by a U.S.–China cold war, its anti-American posture had value. Tehran’s liberals — the Western-leaning elite — saw an opportunity. While denouncing the China deal as a national sellout, they also tried to use their anti-U.S. position as a bargaining chip with China. The logic: “We’re useful to you — pay up.”

But here’s the contradiction: while posturing against the U.S., Tehran was simultaneously trying to mend ties with Washington and Europe, hoping to ease sanctions and attract Western investment. In effect, Iran tried to monetize its anti-Americanism while flirting with the West — a contradictory strategy that neither Washington nor Beijing found trustworthy.

China didn’t slam the door — it simply pulled away the table. The grand $400 billion plan was quietly frozen. In Beijing, Iran’s flip-flopping became a case study in “how not to do diplomacy.”

June 12: The Return of the Prodigal Ally

Then came Israel's deadly all-out strike. And suddenly, Tehran remembered its friends. But the most telling moment wasn’t the attack itself — it was who Tehran called first. It wasn't America, Europe, Russia. It wasn’t even the Arab world.

It was China. And Pakistan.

Not so long ago, Iran openly expressed support for India during its war with Pakistan. It was a clear signal of distance — Tehran did not want to be seen as a close ally of China, let alone as part of the China-Pakistan strategic axis.

That is the irony. For all the posturing, when the Iranian government feared collapse, its instincts turned East. Islamabad — despite having been previously humiliated by Iranian moves toward India — responded swiftly, signaling military readiness. Fighter jets entered Iranian skies.

So if Pakistan is backing Iran, then yes — China definitely is too. Not because of love, but because of necessity. Geography doesn’t lie. Iran sits at the crossroads of Eurasia, the vital node linking the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to the Persian Gulf, and ultimately, to Europe. If Iran falls, the entire southern flank of the Belt and Road unravels.

The Belt and Road is the revival of the vast commercial empire that China once was. It’s the global common ring of prosperity that China is trying to build.

Iran is key to the Belt Road initiative. If Iran falls, the Middle East will become the sole playground of US and Israel.

The Domino Risk

The nightmare scenario? A collapsed Iran triggering a domino effect: Israel follows up with strikes on Hezbollah and the Houthis; Syria descends further into chaos; U.S. fleets return to the Persian Gulf; Saudi and the UAE flip fully West; India uses the vacuum to advance its IMEC corridor, bypassing Pakistan altogether.

And suddenly, China’s entire energy lifeline — its access to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe — is choked off.

That’s not conspiracy. It’s a scenario already modeled by U.S. think tanks and put into action.

Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. If Iran becomes the second domino to fall, China finds itself the last wall standing — alone.

Given the geopolitical reality, China has little choice but to back Iran—if it wants to avoid being strangled by the tightening grip of the U.S. chokehold.

Why China Remains Cautious

But Beijing hasn’t forgotten Iran’s pattern of betrayal.

Despite years of diplomatic lip service, the 25-year agreement has gone nowhere. RMB settlements still lag below 40%, compared to over 90% with Russia. Military deals? Tehran went shopping in Moscow instead — buying Su-35s and S-300s, deliberately sidelining Chinese defense industries.

China doesn’t forget humiliation. Nor does it reward unpredictability.

The Problem Isn’t the Foreign Ministry — It’s the Regime

At the heart of the issue isn’t Iran’s diplomats. It’s Iran’s system. A theocracy cloaked in revolutionary nostalgia, still run by a clergy with Cold War instincts and no consistent foreign policy line.

While Hezbollah and Hamas bleed on the front lines, Tehran dithers. While others die, it negotiates. While the region burns, it whispers to the Americans — "ease sanctions."

That’s why even China keeps a cold distance. It’s not that Tehran doesn’t resist the West — it’s that it resists consistency.

And even more damning: the Iranian people themselves are no longer believers in the system. They wear Zara, stream Western music, protest in the streets, and — in a bitter twist — some even held signs thanking Israel the day of the attack. The regime is losing its base.

What China Wants from Iran

China doesn’t need a “wolf warrior” ally in the Gulf. It needs a bridge.

The purpose of the 25-year deal was simple: turn Iran into a stable anchor for the Belt and Road’s southern corridor. The North is frozen in Ukraine. The Central route is politically fragile. The South — through Pakistan, Iran, to the Mediterranean — is essential.

But for that to happen, Iran has to stabilize. Not just militarily. But Politically. Institutionally.

Beijing’s Message: Stop the Games

So what would it take for China to truly return? After the war, China would likely request a reset:

1. Restore the 25-year agreement — not in rhetoric, but in action.

2. Return port projects to China — including Chabahar.

3. Settle trade in RMB — at scale.

4. Signal strategic alignment — no more jumping between camps.

Because if Iran is serious, China may still open the door. But it will not tolerate a partner that signs deals in the East while flirting with enemies in the West.

China is not America. It doesn’t demand allegiance. But it does expect consistency.

Ironically, the very instability Iran now faces may open a path for deeper Eastward alignment. If the current regime falls — and a secular, pragmatic one emerges — it may, paradoxically, be more open to cooperation with China. A new Iran might value development over dogma.

And that’s Beijing’s real long game. China might be looking for the reformists to emerge.

Because the future of the RMB, the Belt and Road, and China’s strategic position in the Middle East doesn’t depend on which government rules Iran.

It depends on whether China is seen — not just by regimes, but by the Iranian people — as a builder, not a bully.