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This caution is not coldness—it’s calculated strategic patience. If the Khamenei government falls, the next ruling force is likely to be a secular faction. This group may lean West, but they are not necessarily hostile to cooperation with China—provided China presents itself not as a backer of authoritarian regimes, but as a builder of public infrastructure, a promoter of development, and a neutral partner. In fact, a new Iranian government—freed from revolutionary posturing and focused on domestic stability—could be more pragmatic, more efficient, and even more open to deep cooperation with Beijing.

Think one step further: if China wants to push forward a yuan-based settlement mechanism under the Belt and Road Initiative, Iran’s participation will be crucial. But for Iran to adopt RMB settlement, it’s not about which regime is in power. It’s about whether the Iranian people see China as a trusted partner. That’s the foundation for long-term strategic influence—not political alignment, but public legitimacy.

So don’t mistake China’s current distance as indecision. Its position is clear: it supports whoever can bring stability and is willing to build. Theocracy or secularism—that’s Iran’s internal matter. China doesn’t interfere in domestic politics. But it does choose its partners carefully. More than anything else, China wants to be seen as a builder, not a battlefield player. While others are choosing sides, it is laying down railways and bridges. While others fan the flames, it prepares for reconstruction. And for a country like Iran, standing at a historic crossroads, that may be exactly what it needs.

China doesn't want to inadvertently become the enemy of the Iranian people.

Above is purely my personal opinion.

By the way — estranged or not — China has already acted like Iran’s quiet sponsor. Between 2020 and 2023, it bought nearly 40% of Iran’s total oil output during that period. And given that roughly 40% of Iran’s state revenue comes from oil, Beijing, in effect, has been the single largest indirect supporter of the Iranian state.

A Fragile History of Trust: Iran sold out the Chinese tech companies to the US

Iran’s past cooperation with Chinese companies like ZTE and Huawei has not always been smooth. In fact, there have been episodes of deep mistrust — particularly when Iran appeared to side with the United States at China’s expense.

The ZTE Incident: Before 2016, as U.S.-Iran relations began to normalize, Washington demanded that Iran hand over the names of companies that had violated sanctions. Iran complied — and provided a list that included ZTE. As a result, ZTE was later hit with severe U.S. penalties: placed on the “Entity List” and forced to pay massive fines. While ZTE did sell equipment to Iran, these products didn’t exceed U.S. export limits in a proportionate sense. Still, ZTE’s internal missteps — including executive-signed documents and failures to fully comply with U.S. sanctions — made the situation worse.

The Huawei Incident: Huawei also faced fallout from its dealings with Iran. As ties between Tehran and Washington improved, Iran shared information about Huawei’s operations with the U.S., contributing to the high-profile arrest of Meng Wanzhou in Canada and triggering long-term U.S. sanctions. Huawei’s business in Iran may have violated U.S. export control laws, even though Huawei argued that its sales stayed within the proportional limits of U.S.-origin components.

These cases revealed the unpredictable and fragile nature of Iran’s cooperation with Chinese firms under U.S. pressure.

They also exposed a deeper issue: Iran’s shifting stance in international politics and its willingness to make tactical compromises to protect its national security and economic interests. Combined with the possibility of U.S. infiltration inside Iran, these incidents further tightened U.S.-China tensions and dealt a heavy blow to China’s tech sector.