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Will antivirus be more significant on Linux desktop after this xz-util backdoor? (lemmy.world)

submitted 7 months ago* (last edited 7 months ago) by Ramen_LadyHKG@lemmy.world to c/linux@lemmy.ml

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I understand that no Operating System is 100% safe. Although this backdoor is likely only affects certain Linux desktop users, particularly those running unstable Debian or testing builds of Fedora (like versions 40 or 41), **Could this be a sign that antivirus software should be more widely used on Linux desktops? ** ( I know this time is a zero-day attack)

What if, malicious code like this isn't discovered until after it's released to the public? For example, imagine it was included in the initial release of Fedora 40 in April. What if other malware is already widespread and affects more than just SSH, unlike this specific case?

My point is,

Many people believe that Linux desktops don't require antivirus software.
Antivirus can at least stop malware once it's discovered.
Open-source software is protected by many parties, but a backdoor like this one, which reportedly took 2 years to plan and execute, raises my concern about being more cautious when choosing project code maintainers.
Linux desktops will likely be targeted by more attacks as they become more popular.

IMO, antivirus does not save stupid people(who blindly disable antivirus // grant root permission) but it does save some lazy people.

OS rely heavily on users practicing caution and up-to-date(both knowledge and the system). While many users don't follow tech news, they could unknowingly be running (this/any) malware without ever knowing. They might also neglect system updates, despite recommendations from distro maintainers.

This is where antivirus software can be useful. In such cases, users might be somewhat protected once the backdoor signature is added to the antivirus database.

Thankfully, the Linux community and Andres Freund responded quickly to this incident.

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[–] Ramen_LadyHKG@lemmy.world 2 points 7 months ago (1 children)

Real exploiters go bug hunting for zero days. The XZ thing was a humorous clown dancing a jig in a minefield. The clown spent 5 years on the sideline, then stepped on a mine immediately upon entry.

I like your last statement.

I agree that users should take responsibility for their system, I myself learned to fully encrypt my Linux with luks2 and things about secure boot, tpm2 or so.

That's why I'm making assumption of the need for non-tech savvy users, like most Windows users if they come to Linux world.

[–] rotopenguin@infosec.pub 34 points 7 months ago* (last edited 7 months ago)

The xz attack was not a clown show. It's a well orchestrated attack, with a lot of clever techniques to slip a payload into something that is supposed to be fully open and readable source code. Somebody recognized a difference between what people think ssh&systemd's dependency graph looks like, and what it actually was. Fuckery went into disabling some technical defenses (a single dot was snuck into an autoconf file! Try to find it.) and SE went into disabling others. The best malware reversers in the world have been shooting caffeine into their eyeballs for 2 days, trying to make sense of latter-stage payloads.

This attack was damn good. They either got unlucky, or there is a small possibility that our spies out-spied them and dropped the dime. Another angle is that they were running out of time - systemd developers were getting nervous about their own surface area and were working to cut that back. The attacker took the chance on running their play before it was fully bulletproofed, because it was in greater danger of becoming an obsolete exploit.