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DOD’s F-35 has unique capabilities that make it crucial to U.S. national security. DOD awarded billions to 2 defense contractors to build the aircraft and its engine. In 2024, aircraft deliveries were late by an average of 238 days. To encourage timely delivery, among other things, DOD paid the contractors hundreds of millions in incentives over the last several years. Nonetheless, delivery time frames continued to worsen—but DOD continued to pay incentives. DOD plans to increase production until 2032, despite contractors’ inability to keep up with current engine and aircraft deliveries. Our recommendations address these issues, and others.

After years of cost growth and schedule delays in its hardware and software modernization effort for the F-35 aircraft, known as Block 4, the Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of establishing a new major subprogram to help meet cost, schedule, and performance goals. Currently, Block 4 costs are over $6 billion more and completion is at least 5 years later than original estimates. The program plans to reduce the scope of Block 4 to deliver capabilities to the warfighter at a more predictable pace than in the past. Contractors for the program, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, continued delivering aircraft and engines late. For instance, in 2024, Lockheed delivered 110 aircraft. All were late by an average of 238 days, up from 61 days in 2023. Lockheed Martin’s Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—a $1.9-billion suite of hardware and software upgrades that are critical to the Block 4 modernization effort—was the primary driver of late aircraft deliveries in 2024. Evaluating Lockheed Martin’s capacity to deliver aircraft on time would help determine how many aircraft the program should plan to purchase. In recent years, the program paid contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, hundreds of millions of dollars in incentive fees that were intended to improve on-time delivery. However, the structure of on-time delivery incentives allowed the contractor to deliver aircraft up to 60 days late and still earn some of the fee. To avoid rewarding late deliveries, the program should reevaluate its use of fees in future contracts and better align them to achieve desired production outcomes.

As it stands up new modernization subprograms, the F-35 program has opportunities to deliver capabilities faster. GAO’s work on leading practices for product development has found that leading companies employ an iterative process of design, validation, and production to quickly develop and deliver products. While the program is implementing some aspects of these practices, it would benefit from expanding the use of modern design tools, such as digital models that developers can test in a simulated environment, to more rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter than it has historically.

they're... not already doing that? but, uh, I thought the US was a world leader in modern design and manufacturing techniques or something

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter plays a crucial role in national security for the U.S. and its partners and allies. The aircraft’s unique stealth technology and advanced sensor networking systems provide critical capabilities to DOD’s tactical air portfolio. DOD estimates that Block 4 and engine and power thermal management modernization—as well as the costs to maintain and operate the 2,470 planned aircraft over the 77-year life cycle—will exceed $2 trillion. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the F-35 program. This report assesses, among other things, (1) DOD’s progress in Block 4 modernization efforts; (2) the extent to which contractors delivered F-35 engines and aircraft within contract time frames and earned related incentives; and (3) the program’s use of leading practices for product development. GAO conducted site visits to contractor facilities; collected and analyzed cost, schedule, and production data; reviewed relevant program documentation; and interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives.

Recommendations

GAO is making six recommendations to DOD, including that it evaluates Lockheed Martin’s capacity to meet planned deliveries on time; reevaluates the use of incentive fees to better achieve the desired schedule; and expands and formalizes the use of leading practices for product development. DOD concurred with four recommendations and partially concurred with two. For all six recommendations, DOD cited actions it is taking to address them. GAO acknowledges DOD has taken some positive steps and believes further action is warranted to fully address the recommendations, as discussed in the report.

• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should ensure that the F-35 program office evaluates the production capacity of Lockheed Martin to meet the planned delivery quantities on time and adjust the future schedule to better ensure production and sustainment demands can be met.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should ensure that the F-35 program office establishes a comprehensive mechanism containing quality information to track information about F-35 engine and aircraft MVRs.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should ensure that the F-35 program office reevaluates the use of incentive fees to better achieve the desired schedule for future production contracts.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should ensure that the F-35 program office selects and employs an Adaptive Acquisition Framework pathway for the EPM major subprogram.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should ensure that the F-35 program's Block 4 and EPM major subprograms expand the use of the leading practices for product development, such as developing a minimum viable product, pursuing digital twins that can be used to inform development, and updating modeling and simulation tools in real time.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should ensure that the F-35 program formalizes its plan to incorporate leading practices for product development in its Block 4 and EPM major subprogram acquisition documentation.

heh, can't develop a minimum viable product if your product isn't viable

Full Report (54 pages) : https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107632.pdf

The Department of Defense spends tens of billions of dollars annually to sustain its aircraft fleets. But how many of those aircraft are ready for takeoff and able to complete missions? We looked at 49 types of military aircraft and found that only 4 types met their annual mission readiness goals from FY 2011 through FY 2021—an overall decline over time. Program officials gave us various reasons for these results, including aging aircraft, maintenance challenges, and issues with getting parts and supplies. We also reviewed the costs of sustaining these aircraft—which varied by aircraft type and age, fleet size, and number of flying hours.

GAO examined 49 aircraft and found that only four met their annual mission capable goal in a majority of the years from fiscal years 2011 through 2021. As shown below, 26 aircraft did not meet their annual mission capable goal in any fiscal year. The mission capable rate—the percentage of total time when the aircraft can fly and perform at least one mission—is used to assess the health and readiness of an aircraft fleet.

Number of Years Selected Aircraft Met Their Annual Mission Capable Goal, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2021

hah, I love how the good old Huey from Vietnam is literally the only 11/11 one here. sips yep, now that was a chopper... they don't make 'em like they used to...

Comparing fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2021, the average mission capable rate for the selected aircraft has fallen for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, to varying degrees. The average mission capable rate for the selected Army aircraft has risen. For fiscal year 2021, GAO found that only two of the 49 aircraft examined met the service-established mission capable goal. More specifically, for fiscal year 2021, 30 aircraft were more than 10 percentage points below the mission capable goal in fiscal year 2021; and 17 aircraft were 10 percentage points or less below the mission capable goal in fiscal year 2021. Many of the selected aircraft are facing one or more sustainment challenges, as shown below. According to program officials, these challenges have an effect on mission capable rates.

Sustainment Challenges Affecting Some of the Selected Department of Defense Aircraft

"unexpected replacements of parts" combined with "diminishing manufacturing source" is a lovely combination

also love "access to technical data" being a problem, what the fuck happened, did you lose the technical manual under the couch somewhere?! "yeah we just don't know how the plane works anymore, it's lost knowledge", fucking Warhammer 40K-ass country, at least those guys had, like, a massive intergalactic crisis that probably killed trillions as an excuse

Operating and support (O&S) costs totaled about $54 billion in fiscal year 2020 for the reviewed aircraft—a decrease of about $2.9 billion since fiscal year 2011 after factoring in inflation using constant fiscal year 2020 dollars. Maintenance costs became a larger portion of O&S costs—increasing by $1.2 billion since fiscal year 2011. Air Force and Army O&S costs have decreased, while Navy and Marine Corps O&S costs have increased. Based on our analysis and information provided by the program offices, these trends have largely been driven by changes in the size of aircraft inventory and reduced flying hours. Additionally, O&S costs have varied widely across aircraft fleets. For example, the total fiscal year 2020 O&S costs for the systems we reviewed ranged from about $97 million for the KC-130T fleet (Navy and Marine Corps) to a high of about $4.3 billion for the F-16 fleet (Air Force). Based on our analysis and information provided by the system program offices, cost variances were based on aircraft type and factors such as age of the fleet, the number of aircraft included in the inventory, and the number of flying hours flown by a fleet.

...

Full Report (352 pages): https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106217.pdf

The 36-year-old woman from California left the contest’s designated base camp in Pigeon River State Forest, northeast of Gaylord, around 5 p.m. Friday to search for water. But she did not return, so contest hosts began to search for her.

Twelve hours later, around 5 a.m. Saturday, they called 911. Deputies with the Otsego County Sheriff’s Office, Michigan State Police troopers, several other local law enforcement agencies and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources worked together to look for her in woods that were “still damaged from the ice storm” that devastated much of northern Michigan in late March, according to MSP.

Around 10:40 a.m., she was spotted in a swampy area by troopers on the Michigan State Police helicopter. Video shared by MSP shows the woman waving to the helicopter from a heavily wooded area.

“Definitely got her, we’re just trying to work out getting the camera on her real good and then locking in a spot for you guys to get out here, but if you see where the helicopter is, I’m basically right over top of her right now,” the pilot can be heard saying over the radio.

He guided ground crews, including an MSP K-9, to her. They escorted her to safety.

“The female was missing in the cold and rain for almost 18 hours,” the Otsego County Sheriff’s Office wrote in a release.

Deputies said she walked out on her own and didn’t have serious injuries. The woman was not identified by police.