You want to think very carefully before giving a duress password, or using a destructive panic button when dealing with law enforcement. If you do, you will be charged with, at least, destruction of evidence. You have to decide if your data is worth that. A duress password that only decrypts part of your data is probably safer if twinned with deniable encryption, although you still risk legal trouble.

This is in the US, in a lot of countries, even in EU ones, refusing to reveal your password is used as part of the case against you (not as proof but as a suspicious attitude that can, combined with other facts, bring a certainty of culpability).

So be careful and check out your local laws before following US laws concerning this.

That's absolutely possible, but there's not much you can do about that really. My point was simply in response to OP's assertion about encryption protecting your data from 'alphabet agencies'. It wont because it is very unlikely you consider keeping your data confidential more important than your life.

I was actually largely agreeing with you, but responding to the bit where you said:

It Protects your files in case your computer is ever stolen and prevents alphabet agencies from just brute forcing into your Laptop or whatever.

It'll stop alphabet agencies from brute forcing it, sure, but that's not how they would approach extracting the information.

I see ~~~you've~~~ the mod has deleted this comment thread though, so it's unlikely anyone else will see it.

As to your question about what technology would stop it, I think you may need to think differently as no technology will stop a determined enough opponent torturing you for a password, but they're much more likely to attempt a malware style attack against you to skip all that bother. So countermeasures would involve a well locked down system (think about things like SELinux with MLS enabled and using VMs to isolate processes) and good information hygiene practices to reduce the risk of infection and the risk of it spreading if you are infected.

Given its nature and functionality, it's hard to see how the TPM subsystem itself could be backdoored in any meaningful fashion without the rest of the CPU also being compromised. Whilst that is certainly possible, and the remote management engines (IME and such) almost certainly are, it seems more likely to me that the encryption algorythms themselves are deliberately weakened in some way. The NSA, famously, have done that sort of thing before, subtly influencing aspects of the design of cryptographic systems to make them easier for them to break. It would not surprise me, for example, to discover that the supposedly random key material is actually linked to something like your CPU's ID.

None-the-less, using functionality help prevent someone who has your password, but isn't a government actor, decrypting your data.