this post was submitted on 13 Apr 2025
38 points (100.0% liked)

chapotraphouse

13784 readers
915 users here now

Banned? DM Wmill to appeal.

No anti-nautilism posts. See: Eco-fascism Primer

Slop posts go in c/slop. Don't post low-hanging fruit here.

founded 4 years ago
MODERATORS
 

So the reality of a trump presidency is setting in and I'm starting to think of the historical transitions of "world powers". As a hegemon, the US emerged as a world power as a victor in WW1, WW2, and the cold war, all of which were violent conflicts. Now, the US falters as China emerges as their respective philosophies on government play out.

Is there any way the US passes the baton to China in a peaceful manner?

What does that mean for us in the near future?

How's your Saturday night?

you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[–] woodenghost@hexbear.net 24 points 1 week ago (1 children)

I don't know about peaceful, but Giovanni Arrighi explains in The Long Twentieth Century , how and why during the history of capitalism, power passed from one Italian city state to another, then to the Dutch empire, to the British empire, to the American empire and is now in the process of passing to China.

There is a newer edition from 2010 and in it, Arrighi writes about China:

accommodating the upward mobility of a state that by itself accounts for about one-fifth of the world population is an altogether different matter. It implies a fundamental subversion of the very pyramidal structure of the hierarchy. Indeed, to the extent that recent research on world income inequality has detected a statistical trend towards declining inter-country inequality since 1980, this is due entirely to the rapid economic growth of China

we pointed out two major obstacles to a non-catastrophic transition to a more equitable world order. The first obstacle was US resistance to adjustment and accommodation. Paraphrasing David Calleo, (1987: 142) we noted that the Dutchand the British-centered world systems had broken down under the impact of two tendencies: the emergence of aggressive new powers, and the attempt of the declining hegemonic power to avoid adjustment and accommodation by cementing its slipping preeminence into an exploitative domination. Writing in 1999, we maintained: there are no credible aggressive new powers that can provoke the breakdown of the US-centered world system, but the United States has even greater capabilities than Britain did a century ago to convert its declining hegemony into an exploitative domination. If the system eventually breaks down, it will be primarily because of US resistance to adjustment and accommodation. And conversely, US adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic power of the East Asian region is an essential condition for a non-catastrophic transition to a new world order (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 288-9).

About the US response to the burst of the new economy bubble and the war on terror, Arrighi writes:

Indeed, to a far greater extent than in previous hegemonic transitions, the terminal crisis of US hegemony — if that is what we are observing, as I think we are — has been a case of great power “suicide”

Less immediate but equally important, however, is a second obstacle: the still unverified capacity of the agencies of the East Asian economic expansion to “open up a new path of development for themselves and for the world that departs radically from the one that is now at a dead-end.” This would require a fundamental departure from the socially and ecologically unsustainable path of Western development in which the costs for the reproduction of humans and nature have been largely “externalized” (see figure P1), in important measure by excluding the majority of the world’s population from the benefits of economic development. This is an imposing task whose trajectory will in large part be shaped by pressure from movements of protest and self-protection from below.

The growing economic weight of China in the global political economy does not in itself guarantee the emergence of an East Asia-centered world market society based on the mutual respect of the world’s cultures and civilizations. As noted above, such an outcome presupposes a radically different model of development that, among other things, is socially and ecologically sustainable and that provides the global South with a more equitable alternative to continuing Western domination. All previous hegemonic transitions were characterized by long periods of systemic chaos, and this remains a possible alternative outcome. Which of the alternative future scenarios set out in thee Long Twentieth Century materialize remains an open question whose answer will be determined by our collective human agency.

Seems like China, with belt and road, is on a good path for dealing with this second obstacle, so the task for leftists in the imperial core is to deal with the first one: contain the violent lashing out of the dying empire and focus our organizing efforts against war.

[–] Assian_Candor@hexbear.net 6 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (1 children)

Generally agree with the broader points but this is once again French Republic erasure. Monarchism collapsed because the grand armee shoved Republicanism down the continent's throat

[–] woodenghost@hexbear.net 4 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

I agree, that topic is too often ignored. But the point of the book is not transitions from one economic system to the other, but transitions of centers of capitalist power from one region to another. Including centers of trade and centers of finance, that existed before capitalism really became the dominant economic system worldwide. Though capitalist production of commodities already existed in places. And then the book focuses on the hegemonies. France lost the seven year war and that was part of the reason why the revolution happened there. And even if it rivaled Britain for some time, the French empire never became hegemonic at the same global scale.