Rumer would argue that reducing Putin's actions to mere desire for invasion and control oversimplifies Russia's strategic calculus. Instead, he would frame it as:

A cycle of action and reaction, because Russian aggression is often a response to perceived threats, but it reinforces the very insecurity it seeks to avoid.
A call for nuanced policy, as the West must deter Russian aggression while addressing legitimate security concerns through diplomacy and arms control.

He would argue that Putin's insistence on non-NATO neighbors is driven by deep-seated strategic culture and historical trauma, but it cannot justify violating sovereignty. A sustainable solution would require balancing deterrence with engagement to break the cycle of conflict

[+] Bell@lemmy.world -14 points 3 weeks ago (12 children)

He (or you) ascribes alot of nuance and careful consideration to someone who has demonstrated nothing but malice and avarice. Putin clearly cares nothing for both the people of Ukraine and his own people. Why are we trying so hard to be understanding to a murderous dictator?

[–] emergencyfood@sh.itjust.works 11 points 3 weeks ago (3 children)

Invading Ukraine has created economic and military challenges for Russia. If only Putin supported the invasion, and everyone else in Russia opposed it, Putin wouldn't be the President of Russia now. So, we must try to understand who in Russia supports this action. The military / security services are an obvious answer - they would see the risk of a NATO expansion up to the Russian border as a danger that must be avoided at all costs.

[+] Marbles@discuss.tchncs.de -4 points 3 weeks ago (2 children)

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[–] emergencyfood@sh.itjust.works 2 points 3 weeks ago

In the 90s and early 00s, Russia had bigger issues to worry about.

[–] GiorgioPerlasca@lemmy.ml 2 points 3 weeks ago

There are many issues with your comment.

"Putin had no problems in 2004" is incorrect. Russia's reaction to the expansion of NATO in 2004 was immediate, harsh, and contained threats of specific counter-measures.

"In 2007, he suddenly got scared" is an incorrect interpretation. The Munich Speech of 2007 was not a sudden reaction of fear, but a thoughtful, ideological and strategic statement by a strengthened Russia. It marked the transition to a tougher and more independent foreign policy course based on rejection of American hegemony and an insistence on taking into account Russian security interests.

The rhetorical escalation was not the result of a sudden emotion, but the result of the accumulation of systemic contradictions, the unwillingness of the West to take into account Moscow's concerns and the strengthening of Russia, which was ready to challenge the status quo that did not suit it.

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