The Empire of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 would be a better starting point, but other candidates include 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1941. There was significantly more fighting throughout the 1930s than the 1920s. An important reason (if not the most important) for WWII was the Great Depression. See the link for details.

[+] wtckt@lemm.ee -14 points 1 day ago (19 children)

Far more useful.... The soviet union was an ally of fascist nazi Germany.

The allies liberated western Europe and supplied loads of machinery to the soviet union. And thank god they did. And thank god they didn't stop further west.

[–] AnarchoBolshevik@lemmygrad.ml 11 points 1 day ago (9 children)

No, the relations between Fascist Italy and the Third Reich were an alliance. The relations between the Slovak Republic and the Third Reich were an alliance. The German–Soviet Pact was 1.8 years of neutrality, which the Western Axis broke by launching the largest and deadliest invasion in all of history, yet for some reason antisocialists seem far more interested in the Pact than the invasion.

We can spend all day condemning the German–Soviet Pact to the lowest depths of Hell and overrate its importance to be greater than every other event in history combined. It won’t get us a damn bit closer to understanding the circumstances that made it a likely outcome. Because unlike you, I take tragedies seriously by thoroughly examining their causes as well as their effects. That is why I taught people about the Pact from the Fascist bourgeoisie’s point of view whereas generic antisocialists have bupkes to say about that subject.

[+] wtckt@lemm.ee -9 points 1 day ago (1 children)

So the secret clause was inevitable and necessary. The soviet union had to attack Poland together with Germany and had to do horrible atrocities while doing so? You don't take anything serious other than soviet apologism.

[–] AnarchoBolshevik@lemmygrad.ml 8 points 1 day ago* (last edited 1 day ago) (1 children)

It was no doubt disgraceful that Soviet Russia should make any agreement with the leading Fascist state; but this reproach came ill from the statesmen who went to Munich. […] [The German–Soviet] pact contained none of the fulsome expressions of friendship which Chamberlain had put into the Anglo‐German declaration on the day after the Munich conference.

Indeed Stalin rejected any such expressions: “the Soviet Government could not suddenly present to the public German–Soviet assurances of friendship after they had been covered with buckets of filth by the [Fascist] Government for six years.” The pact was neither an alliance nor an agreement for the partition of Poland. Munich had been a true alliance for partition: the British and French dictated partition to the Czechs.

The Soviet government undertook no such action against the Poles. They merely promised to remain neutral, which is what the Poles had always asked them to do and which Western policy implied also. More than this, the agreement was in the last resort anti‐German: it limited the German advance eastwards in case of war, as Winston Churchill emphasized. […] [With the pact, the Soviets hoped to ward] off what they had most dreaded—a united capitalist attack on Soviet Russia. […] It is difficult to see what other course Soviet Russia could have followed.

— A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, pg. 262

When [the Fascists] attacked Poland, the Soviets moved into Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the Baltic territories that had been taken from them by Germany, Britain, and Poland in 1919. They overthrew the [anticommunist] dictatorships that the Western counterrevolutionaries had installed in the Baltic states and incorporated them as three republics into the USSR. The Soviets also took back Western Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine, and other areas seized from them and incorporated into the Polish [anticommunist] dictatorship in 1921 under the Treaty of Riga.

This has been portrayed as proof that they colluded with the [Fascists] to gobble up Poland, but the Soviets reoccupied only the area that had been taken from them twenty years before. History offers few if any examples of a nation refusing the opportunity to regain territory that had been seized from it. In any case, as Taylor notes, by reclaiming their old boundaries, the Soviets drew a line on the [Fascist] advance which was more than what Great Britain and France seemed willing to do.

— Michael Parenti, The Sword and the Dollar, pgs. 144–145

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